

AD HOC BOARD COMPOSITION COMMITTEE


Metro Board Member Composition and Appointment Structure

June 29, 2026

The Committee's Mandate: Motion 33.1


Following the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee by Chair Dutra in early January 2026, the Metro Board approved Motion 33.1 which directed that deliberations and recommendations be informed by relevant comparative, historical, and demographic context as well as community outreach and stakeholder engagement — highlighting the following values:

Geographic Equity




Any changes must preserve fair representation across all regions of Los Angeles County

Balanced Representation




The Board structure must maintain appropriate balance across the County, City of Los Angeles, and the 87-cities.

Cost Neutrality



Governance reforms should not impose new financial burdens on the agency or its riders.

Jurisdictional Inclusion



All jurisdictions within Metro's service area should have a meaningful voice in governance.

These principles guided the development of the guiding values, the creation of all alternatives and remain the evaluative framework.

Countywide Community Outreach



Feb – May 2026

Multi-pronged countywide engagement effort



25 stakeholder organizations



9 hybrid listening sessions across LA County



13 pop-up transit intercepts

Targeted at high-ridership bus and rail locations




~90% of LA County ZIP codes

Represented in survey responses



TAP card cross-reference

Confirmed outreach reached highest-ridership corridors in South, East & Central LA



1,300+ engagement touchpoints **900+** survey responses

Map: ZIP Codes with Bus Boardings in Top 2 Quantiles, overlaid with outreach locations

Governance Alternatives Presented in May

A

Flexible Appointments

Expands the pool each appointing authority may draw from to include qualified public members, riders, or subject matter experts alongside elected officials. Maintains intergovernmental balance and adapts to Measure G.

B

Directly Elected Board

Reconstitutes the Board by replacing all appointment tiers with direct elections from newly drawn geographic districts. Advances electoral accountability but significantly alters intergovernmental balance.

C

Non-Voting Rider Representative

Adds a designated non-voting rider seat in response to outreach calling for a formal rider voice. Brings rider perspective into deliberations without disrupting existing intergovernmental balance.

D

Maintain Existing Appointments

Retains the current structure; once the elected County CEO takes effect, the County may designate the CEO as one of its five Board seats. Preserves existing balance, transparency, and electoral accountability but limits potential eligibility of Board members.

All four alternatives require amendment to Metro's enabling State statute (Public Utilities Code) to implement.

Should the Metro Board Include Formal Rider Representation?

Community Outreach

The most consistent outreach finding across all channels was the desire for Board members who understand the day-to-day experience of riding Metro.

Peer Benchmarking

Peer and reference agency references:

- MBTA & WMATA: Voting rider or transit-rider seats
- NY MTA: Non-voting rider seats (appointed by Governor)

Other agencies - No formal rider seat; instead rely on rider-experienced appointees.

Guiding Values

The Committee's adopted Guiding Governance Values call for:

- Customer Experience: Board decisions informed by firsthand rider perspectives
- Accountability: Appointees connected to the communities they serve
- Functional Effectiveness: Changes should not impose new seats or administrative burden

1

Voting Rider Seat

+ Rider voice in deliberations; equal weight in Board decisions

- Weakens accountability chain; one individual expected to represent rider perspective, adds costs

2

Non-Voting Rider Seat

+ Rider voice in deliberations; preserves Board structure

- Cannot call votes or formally move motions; influence depends on voting members' responsiveness, one individual expected to represent rider perspective, adds costs

3

Alternative A — Flexible Appointments ★ Staff Recommendation

+ Rider voice in deliberations; enables authorities to fill existing seats with riders/rider-experienced individuals; no added cost; consistent with peer norms

- Enables but does not require rider appointment by each authority; however, staff recommendation C mitigates this by providing guidelines that support rider experience by all board members, including elected officials.

Should Metro Establish a Formal Labor Seat on the Board?

Metro Has One of the Strongest Labor Partnerships in the Nation

- ✓ **Agencywide Project Labor Agreement** with the LA/Orange Counties Building & Construction Trades Council — covering all projects above \$2.5M and the first transit PLA to receive FTA approval for national targeted hiring goals on federally funded projects.
- ✓ **Labor's interests are substantially represented** through established labor engagement processes.

Community Outreach: No Public Mandate

Nearly 900 survey responses and 1,300+ engagement touchpoints did not surface explicit public support for a formal labor seat. Feedback focused on rider experience, subject matter expertise, and accountability.

Peer Benchmarking: No Voting Precedent

No comparable peer agency has established a voting labor seat, except MBTA. Where labor representation exists, it is non-voting: NY MTA (3 rotating non-voting seats, selected by bargaining units), Community Transit (non-voting, selected by bargaining units), Sound Transit (non-voting, currently vacant). Washington State codifies non-voting labor seats by statute.

Guiding Values: Equity of Stakeholder Interests

Designating a seat for labor would prioritize that perspective over business, environmental, housing, and public health stakeholders. The Committee's Guiding Values call for balanced, accountable representation rather than codified interest-group seats.

Should the County CEO Have a Dedicated Seat and/or Appointing Authority?

No Public Demand through Community Outreach

Metro's countywide outreach yielded no explicit public input calling for a CEO Board seat or CEO appointing authority. Two COGs — South Bay Cities and Las Virgenes-Malibu — formally opposed any dedicated CEO seat, citing concerns about diluting city representation.

CEO's Role Under Measure G

CEO powers are internal to county operations and is silent on CEO appointment authority over external agencies like Metro, because it is an independent regional agency, not a county department. Measure G does not assign the CEO an explicit role in intergovernmental relations or external agency governance.

Measure G Alignment

Alternative A preserves the County's flexibility to designate the future elected CEO as one of its five Board seats — responsive to Measure G without going beyond what voters sanctioned.

Measure G Implementation Task Force

The scope of the CEO's authority over external bodies remains an open question under the ongoing Measure G implementation process. The Governance Reform Task Force is actively working through how CEO appointment powers apply to non-county agencies.

Should Long Beach Have A Dedicated Seat?



1

Not Raised in Community Outreach

Prior to the May 27 meeting, no Metro outreach activity — listening sessions, transit intercepts, or surveys — surfaced advocacy for a dedicated Long Beach seat. Advocacy at the meeting came from Long Beach elected officials/representatives, including a letter from Director Hahn.

2

Population-Based Equity Concerns

Any dedicated city seat should be evaluated in the context of overall city representation on the Board. Large population clusters in other COG areas lack dedicated representation. Further, Long Beach (~455K residents) is significantly less than the City of LA (~4M+).

3

Risk to 87-City Balance

The existing COG ratification process has historically produced geographic diversity in sector representation. A dedicated seat for a single city or subset of cities— at the expense of the broader COG-based selection process — may be difficult to explain and defend to other municipalities that have not received comparable treatment.

4

Opportunity for Subregional Appointing Authorities

Population-weighted voting within COG subregions makes it structurally difficult for smaller cities to secure sector seats when larger cities compete. The Committee could encourage the City Selection Committee and League of California Cities to study whether process reforms can address the underlying concern.

Proportional Representation & Voting Alternates: What Changes Are Warranted?

Proportional Representation for the 87 Cities

The structural gap: Under Public Utilities Code §130051, the 87 cities hold approximately 31% of Metro's voting seats while representing more than 50% of LA County's population — a gap that has persisted since the mid-1990s without adjustment.

Important context: This comparison does not account for the fact that many of the 87 cities operate their own municipal transit systems — including Long Beach Transit, Foothill Transit, Culver CityBus, Big Blue Bus, and Santa Clarita Transit. Those cities already have a direct local governance channel over a portion of their transit service not reflected in a Metro-seats-to-population ratio. It also doesn't account for where Metro's service is most concentrated.

Voting Alternates

Why alternates were discontinued: Alternates could hold different policy positions than the members they represented, diffusing accountability on major policy and financial decisions. The ability to meet quorum has not been a significant concern.

Administrative burden: Reinstating alternates would require additional briefings, noticing, and recordkeeping for a second tier of Board-eligible individuals across every appointing authority, adding additional administrative costs.

Recommendation: Staff does not recommend reinstating voting alternates.

Governance Alternatives Presented in May

A

★ Staff Recommended

Flexible Appointments

Expands the pool each appointing authority may draw from to include qualified public members, riders, or subject matter experts alongside elected officials. Maintains intergovernmental balance and adapts to Measure G.

B

Not Recommended

Directly Elected Board

Reconstitutes the Board by replacing all appointment tiers with direct elections from newly drawn geographic districts. Advances electoral accountability but significantly alters intergovernmental balance.

C

Not Recommended

Non-Voting Rider Representative

Adds a designated non-voting rider seat in response to outreach calling for a formal rider voice. Brings rider perspective into deliberations without disrupting existing intergovernmental balance.

D

Not Recommended

Maintain Existing Appointments

Retains the current structure; once the elected County CEO takes effect, the County may designate the CEO as one of its five Board seats. Preserves existing balance, transparency, and electoral accountability but limits potential potential eligibility of Board members.

All four alternatives require amendment to Metro's enabling State statute (Public Utilities Code) to implement.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1

Advance Alternative A — Flexible Appointments

Enable each appointing authority (County: 5 seats, City of LA: 4 seats, City Selection Committee: 4 seats, Governor: 1 seat) to fill their allocated seats with elected officials, qualified public members, riders, or subject matter experts.

2

Pursue State Legislation

Amend Metro's enabling State statute (Public Utilities Code) to memorialize this governance change.

3

Develop Appointment Guidelines

Direct the CEO to prepare recommended guidelines for appointing authorities that foster ongoing engagement between Board members and Metro's transit system — including bus, rail, Metrolink, bike share, and municipal operators.