Meeting_Body
REGULAR BOARD MEETING
JULY 23, 2026
Subject
SUBJECT: METRO BOARD MEMBER COMPOSITION AND APPOINTMENT STRUCTURE
Action
ACTION: APPROVE RECOMMENDATION
Heading
RECOMMENDATION
Title
APPROVE the staff recommendation on Metro's Board Member Composition and Appointment Structure to:
A. ADOPT "Alternative A (Flexible Appointments)" that would enable each Appointing Authority to have the flexibility to fill their allocated seats (County of Los Angeles - 5 seats, City of Los Angeles - 4 seats, City Selection Committee - 4 seats, Governor - 1 non-voting seat) with either elected officials or qualified public members, including special interest stakeholders, transit system users/riders, or subject matter experts; and
B. ADOPT the framework for guidelines that could be used by the Appointing Authorities to support their appointment process under "Alternative A" so that all members, regardless of prior ridership experience, build firsthand familiarity with the customer experience once appointed (Attachment A).
Issue
ISSUE
For over the past decade, Metro's State Legislative Platform has memorialized the position of the agency, that any decisions regarding Metro governance should be driven at the local level, and that legislation not sponsored by Metro that seeks to restructure the Metro Board of Directors should be opposed.
The Ad Hoc Board Composition Committee (Committee) was established in February 2026 to evaluate Metro's governance framework, considering Measure G, which expands the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors from five to nine members in 2032.
A key policy question before the Committee is whether to modify the Metro Board composition following these changes to County governance. Following peer benchmarking, community outreach and engagement efforts, and recent Committee deliberations, five alternatives have been developed, proposing new changes to the Board's composition for the Board’s consideration.
Background
BACKGROUND
Metro's Legislative Platform, adopted annually by the Metro Board, has memorialized the position of the agency that any decisions regarding Metro governance should be driven at the local level, and that legislation not sponsored by Metro that seeks to restructure the Metro Board should be opposed.
The establishment of the Ad Hoc Board Composition Committee was driven by two objectives: ensuring that a locally-driven recommendation on Board composition changes could be presented for legislative memorialization in light of recent attempts from the legislature to prescribe a governance change without the input of the Metro Board, and responding to the existing statutory requirement that Metro submit a plan to the Legislature for revising the composition of the Metro Board within 60 days of any increase in the membership of the County Board of Supervisors (although technically not required until January 2033).
Following the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee by then Chair of the Board Dutra in early January 2026, the Board approved Motion 33.1 by Directors Dutra, Barger, Horvath, Padilla, Najarian and Dupont-Walker (Attachment B), which directed that deliberations and recommendations be informed by relevant comparative, historical, and demographic context as well as community outreach and stakeholder engagement. The motion further enforced that the Board should continue to reflect the diversity and geographic breadth of the County it serves, and that any consideration of potential changes be guided by principles of geographic equity, balanced representation, cost neutrality, and jurisdictional inclusion.
Since its first meeting in February 2026, the Committee has reviewed Metro's governance history and statutory framework (February 2026), completed a benchmarking analysis of 12 peer and reference transit agencies (March 2026), reviewed Metro's advisory body network, and adopted Guiding Governance Values (April 2026).
A multi-pronged countywide engagement effort took place between February and mid-May 2026. It included presentations to 25 stakeholder organizations (over 900 attendees), nine hybrid listening sessions hosted by Metro's five service councils, PSAC, and the CAC, a countywide virtual listening session, a North County listening session, and 13 pop-up transit intercepts at locations across the County. Staff also established a dedicated website, online surveys, live polling, and community comment channels via email and phone. Collectively, these efforts generated 1,300 engagement touchpoints and 900 survey responses, reflecting broad participation across the County.
At its May 27th meeting, the Committee received a comprehensive community outreach report and presentation on four new governance alternatives - Alternative A (Flexible Appointments), Alternative B (Directly Elected Board), Alternative C (Non-Voting Rider Representative), and Alternative D (Maintaining Board Appointments).
• Alternative A - Flexible Appointments: This alternative would introduce a new appointment option within Metro's existing structure, expanding the pool of individuals each appointing authority - the County, City of Los Angeles, and the City Selection Committee - may draw from to fill their allocated seats to include qualified public members, including transit system riders/users, special interest stakeholders, or subject matter experts, alongside elected officials. This alternative maintains intergovernmental balance and functional effectiveness, responds to the outreach theme of inclusion of a rider voice, and adapts to Measure G by preserving the County's flexibility to designate the future elected County CEO as one of its five seats. However, its ability to advance regional equity and customer experience depends on each appointing authority's adoption of criteria.
• Alternative B - Directly Elected Board: This alternative would fundamentally reconstitute the Board by replacing all appointment tiers with direct elections from newly drawn geographic districts across Los Angeles County. This alternative most directly advances electoral accountability, as Board members would be chosen by voters on transportation issues alone. In doing so, this alternative also responds to the outreach theme of inclusion of a rider voice. However, it would significantly alter intergovernmental balance by removing appointment authority from the County, City of LA, and other cities, potentially weakening the intergovernmental relationships that support state and federal funding advocacy. Staff also noted concerns regarding the administrative cost of countywide elections and the structural rigidity of district-based representation, which would require additional legislative action to redraw in response to demographic or governance changes.
• Alternative C - Non-Voting Rider Representative: This alternative adds a designated seat in response to the outreach theme calling for inclusion of a rider voice, bringing a rider perspective into Board deliberations. However, the experience of Metro's ridership is not uniform, and a single appointee cannot be expected to represent the full range of rider experience across geography, income, and mode.
• Alternative D - Maintain Existing Board Appointments: This alternative would retain the current appointment structure, with a new feature: once the elected County CEO position takes effect under Measure G, the County would have the flexibility to designate the CEO as one of its five Board of Supervisors-appointed seats. All other appointment authorities would remain consistent with current statutory requirements. This alternative preserves intergovernmental balance, transparency, functional effectiveness, and electoral accountability, consistent with peer agency practice, and is directly responsive to Measure G. When the Board of Supervisors expands to nine members in 2032, five of those members, potentially including the elected County CEO, would be eligible to serve on the Metro Board.
The alternatives reflected community outreach findings, aligned with the Guiding Governance Values adopted by the Committee (Attachment C), and were informed by peer agency practice. All four alternatives proposed new changes to the composition of the Board structure while maintaining the number of voting members, and all would require an amendment to Metro's enabling State statute to implement.
Board expansion, under any alternative, is not recommended. Peer agencies average approximately 10 voting members, and expansion would risk disrupting intergovernmental balance while imposing additional administrative and compensation costs. Community outreach also did not surface advocacy for a larger Board; participants instead called for greater accountability and inclusion of a rider voice.
At its May 2026 meeting, several Committee members requested additional context on the community outreach and stakeholder engagement, as well as further analysis on a broader set of governance structure questions raised during the discussion, including rider representation, labor representation, the County Chief Executive Officer seat, City of Long Beach representation, proportional representation for the 87 cities, and voting alternates.
Discussion
DISCUSSION
At its June 2026 meeting, the Committee members shared their perspectives, provided comments about Alternative A, and asked for additional information related to topics below.
Outreach Data
The Committee requested additional detail regarding the distribution of engagement activities and survey responses, to confirm that there was a concerted effort to engage respondents in South Los Angeles, East Los Angeles, and Central Los Angeles.
In response to this request, Metro cross-referenced ridership data with respondent zip codes. The analysis confirms that outreach successfully targeted the highest-ridership corridors within South, East, and Central Los Angeles. As shown in Attachment D, the majority of outreach activities occurred within the zip codes where there is the highest concentration of bus and rail ridership. In addition, Metro staff collected surveys from approximately 90% of zip codes across LA County - and those zip codes that were not represented correspond with areas of LA County that are not reliant on Metro transit service. During the June Committee Meeting, staff confirmed that approximately 43% of listening session participants, and approximately 73% of in-person transit intercept respondents in the Central and Southeast Los Angeles corridors, identified as City of Los Angeles residents.
Between February and May, Metro staff engaged residents through both direct transit-rider outreach and broader community partnerships, including:
• Direct Transit Outreach: Targeted engagement at Metro transit centers and high-traffic bus and transit hubs.
• Community Events & Activations: Tabling and interactive pop-ups at regional events, such as the Santa Clarita Cowboy Festival and the Pomona Night Market (hosted through Metro's Station Activation programs).
• Listening Sessions & Partner Networks: Dedicated sessions with Metro Service Councils and Advisory Committees, alongside localized flyer distribution through trusted partners like the Metro LIFE program at L.A. Care community centers.
Formal Subregional Agency Feedback
At its May meeting, the Committee had confirmed its interest in seeking feedback from the eight subregional entities, which is comprised of Councils of Governments (COG) and joint power authorities. As of July 17, 2026, five of the eight subregional entities had submitted formal positions As reported at the June Ad Hoc Committee, since the Committee was formed, Metro staff have consistently engaged with all the subregional entities to make announcements, deliver presentations, answer questions and ensure COG and JPA staff were kept updated on Committee meeting dates and the process for submitting their positions and public comment. The following summarizes feedback received from the subregional agencies as of the printing of this report.
• South Bay Cities COG - Opposes any changes to Metro Board governance, arguing that Measure G does not justify board expansion and that if Supervisorial seats increase, the Board of Supervisors should select five of its nine members to sit on the Metro Board rather than adding new seats, and that there should not be an additional dedicated seat for the County's future elected CEO.
• Las Virgenes-Malibu COG - Opposes any modifications to Metro Board governance, contending that Measure G's creation of new Supervisorial seats does not warrant board expansion and that the County should designate five of its nine future Supervisors to serve, without adding a dedicated seat for the elected County CEO.
• San Fernando Valley COG - Supports maintaining the current governance structure and urges that any changes do not diminish regional representation or diminish the voice of the San Fernando Valley.
• San Gabriel Valley COG - Endorses Alternative D (Maintaining Board Appointments), arguing it best preserves the existing subregional representation framework, maintains accountability to local jurisdictions through representation by elected officials, provides continuity and governance stability during the implementation of Measure G; avoids unintended consequences that could diminish the voice of local governments and subregions within Metro governance; and accommodates the future elected County Executive without disrupting the established balance between countywide and subregional interests. Emphasizes that future consideration of Board expansion should enhance not diminish subregional representation, geographic equity, and local government accountability.
• Westside Council of Governments (WSCCOG) - Supports a substantive review of Metro Board composition in light of Measure G, arguing that a 13-member Board falls short of peer representational standards given Metro's scale. Recommends that any expansion of County representation be matched by a corresponding expansion of city and COG representation, including direct WSCCOG representation, and encourages the Committee to consider a fully voting Board seat dedicated to transit rider representation.
• Gateway Cities COG: Supports the creation of a dedicated Metro Board seat for the City of Long Beach based on the City’s population, economic importance and role in the regional transportation network, arguing that a seat for Long Beach would create more equitable representation for the other cities of the Gateway Cities subregion to compete for a seat on the Metro Board through the City Selection Committee process. Recommends the County maintain its existing five seats on the Board and determine how to fill them.
Committee Requested Governance Structure Considerations
The following sections address the specific issues raised during the May and June Committee meetings, including the rider representative's voting status, labor representation, a designated seat for the County CEO, representation for the City of Long Beach, proportional representation for the 87 cities, and the reinstatement of Board Member alternates.
Rider Representation on the Metro Board
The Committee discussion focused on whether a rider representative on the Metro Board should serve as a voting or non-voting member. Staff evaluated this issue against the Committee's adopted values, the findings from Metro's countywide outreach effort, and the peer agency benchmarking analysis.
• Community Outreach: The single most consistent finding across Metro's countywide outreach effort was a desire for the Metro Board to include members who understand the day-to-day experience of riding Metro. Across all engagement channels - listening sessions, transit intercepts, online surveys, and stakeholder presentations - participants emphasized that board members should reflect the communities and riders the system serves. This theme emerged consistently from riders in South Los Angeles, the San Fernando Valley, the Gateway Cities corridor, and the North County. Community outreach consistently surfaced a desire for a formal rider voice on the Metro Board, understood broadly as Board members who engage with and have firsthand familiarity with Metro's system.
• Peer Benchmarking and Guiding Values: The following summarizes three scenarios for incorporating rider representation on the Metro Board, each analyzed against the Committee's adopted values and in relation to the completed peer benchmarking.
1. Voting Rider Representative: A voting rider seat would give rider perspectives equal weight in Board decisions on service, fares, and capital investment, and follows precedent at peer agencies such as the MBTA and WMATA. At MBTA, which is a state agency of Massachusetts, the Governor appoints a voting rider representative who must also be a resident of an environmental justice population. At WMATA, which is an interstate compact agency with federal agency involvement, one of the two federal seats must be held by an individual with rider qualifications.
2. Non-Voting Rider Representative: A non-voting seat would guarantee a rider voice in deliberations while preserving the Board's existing intergovernmental balance and functional structure, consistent with precedent at the NY MTA. In NY MTA, the New York Governor makes all formal nominations for Board seats.
3. Voting Rider Through an Existing Appointed Seat: Under Alternative A, each appointing authority may choose to fill its existing seats with riders or rider-experienced individuals, or individuals who would foster engagement with transit users.
Staff does not recommend Scenarios 1 or 2, as both would require expansion of the Board, creating administrative and financial burdens on the agency. This would be inconsistent with the Board's direction that any governance changes be cost neutral. Scenario 3 does not create a new seat; rather, it reflects a new proposed change -- that, under Alternative A, each appointing authority may choose to fill its existing seats with riders or rider-experienced individuals.
Appointment Guidelines Framework
Given that Alternative A enables, but does not require, any appointing authority to appoint a rider, staff recommends incorporation of accountability mechanisms through the adoption of an appointment framework for all members (Attachment A). If implemented by an Appointing Authority, the framework would create transparency and accountability in ensuring a thoughtful appointment process.
A flexible model also raises a second, related question: whether it could reduce the number of elected officials among appointees, given that Appointing Authorities would no longer be required to select one. Metro's experience with a comparable flexible-appointment structure suggests this concern is unlikely to materialize in practice. The Service Councils, which similarly permit - but do not require - appointing authorities to select non-elected members, have drawn more than a third of their overall membership (79 of 219, 36%) from city elected officials since their creation in 2002, reaching as high as two-thirds on the Gateway Cities and San Gabriel Valley Service Councils. Conversely, these elected officials typically also have a transit or special interest stakeholder background. This suggests that Appointing Authorities that value elected representation have continued to provide it even where the structure does not require it.
In developing this framework, staff drew upon best practices and lessons learned from the agency's selection processes for Metro-led advisory bodies, including the Service Councils, the Public Safety Advisory Committee, and the Youth Council. These selection processes, which consist of a publicly promoted application, interview, and vetting process, have yielded appointees with substantial ridership experience, reinforcing that a well-designed administrative process, not a mandatory rider requirement, can reliably produce riders who are well positioned to engage on governance issues. These efforts have yielded broad interest (PSAC received 580 applications, the Youth Council received 200 applications) and resulted in appointees with diverse perspectives and meaningful ridership and subject matter expertise.
While the appointment process would continue to lie with the Appointing Authorities, Metro could collect information from each on how it considered the guidelines in making its appointments and issue an annual report documenting those practices across all Appointing Authorities.
New Proposal from June Committee
At its June committee, Chair Najarian requested that staff analyze the following proposal by Committee Member Fasana seconded by Director Horvath:
Add 3 members to the staff recommendation: a rider appointed by the county supervisors residing in an unincorporated area, a labor representative, the county executive, and that we revise the 35% threshold in statute for the City of Los Angeles seats to 43.75%. The analysis of each of these elements is below.
Designation for Unincorporated Area Rider
The Alternative raised at the June Committee meeting proposed designating one of the rider representative seats specifically for a rider residing in an unincorporated area of Los Angeles County. Under this approach, the seat would carry a geographic qualification in addition to the rider qualification, on the premise that residents of unincorporated communities are not represented through the City Selection Committee process and therefore warrant a dedicated voice on the Board. Staff evaluated this proposal against the Committee's adopted values, feedback received through the community outreach process, peer agency practice, and the representational structure that applies to Metro's existing Board Members. This concept was not raised during community outreach, is not a practice consistently used by peer agencies, and would establish a narrower representational scope than applied to any other Board seat.
Staff further notes that unincorporated communities are not without representation under the current structure. Metro's Board Members appointed by the Los Angeles Mayor and the City Selection Committee are responsible for representing the broad constituency they were appointed to represent --- which includes unincorporated portions of the subregions and is not limited to their specific constituents. The same expectation should apply to the subset of representatives from the County, if and when the entire Board of Supervisors no longer serves by virtue of elected office. Therefore, a rider representative appointed to represent only unincorporated areas would be inconsistent with the broader representational expectation that applies to all other appointed Board Members and would be unnecessarily narrow in scope.
In the event that the Board opts to designate a dedicated rider seat on the Board, staff recommends the appointing authority for the rider seat rotate every four years among the three appointing authorities and authorizing Metro to conduct a robust and transparent selection process that would include a publicly accessible application and interview process.
Labor Representation
The Committee raised the question of whether Metro's governance structure should include formal representation for labor - specifically, whether a voting seat should be designated for a representative from organized labor, given labor's central role in Metro's construction, operations, and service delivery.
• Community Outreach: Metro's three-month community engagement effort, which generated nearly 900 survey responses and more than 1,300 engagement touchpoints, did not surface explicit public support for formal labor representation or any other specific interest or stakeholder group (beyond rider representation) on the Board. Community feedback focused broadly on the need for rider experience, subject matter expertise, and accountability in governance. In fact, one piece of feedback from the Bizfed-distributed survey explicitly opposed a labor representative and instead called for a representative from the business community.
• Peer Agency Benchmarking and Guiding Values: The following summarizes three scenarios for incorporating Labor representation on the Metro Board, each analyzed against the Committee's adopted values and in relation to the completed peer benchmarking.
1. Voting Labor Representative: A voting labor seat would give labor perspectives equal weight in Board decisions. The MBTA, which is a state-run agency, is the only agency identified with a voting labor seat. Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 161A, § 7(a), the Governor appoints one of the MBTA's nine directors from a list of three persons recommended by the president of the Massachusetts State Labor Council, AFL-CIO; the member serves a four-year term subject to a two-term limit. The seat, created in 2021, belongs to the state labor federation rather than to the agency's own transit unions.
2. Non-Voting Labor Representative: A non-voting seat would provide a labor voice in deliberations while preserving the Board's existing intergovernmental balance and functional structure, consistent with precedent at the NY MTA. Among peer agencies where labor representation exists, it takes the form of a non-voting seat, typically tied to the agency's own bargaining units rather than to organized labor broadly. At the NY MTA, the Governor makes all formal Board nominations, which are subject to State Senate confirmation. N.Y. Public Authorities Law § 1263(1)(a)(2) provides for a non-voting labor member recommended to the Governor (with the advice and consent of the state senate) by the union representing the majority of Long Island Railroad employees, with NYC Transit and Metro-North union designees serving as alternates on eighteen-month rotating terms. At NY MTA, the chair may exclude the member from meetings on labor negotiations, and the provision sunsets June 30, 2028 unless renewed. Committee members had also requested that staff review agencies in Washington State, where RCW 36.57A.050(3)(c) and parallel statutes (RCW 36.57.030; RCW 35.58.270) have required since 2010 that local transit authorities seat one non-voting member recommended by the labor organization(s) representing the agency's own transit workforce (selected by majority vote where more than one union is present), serving a four-year term. Under these statutes, the chair must exclude the member from executive sessions concerning labor negotiations. During the 2023-24 legislative session, HB 1219 proposed, but did not enact, conversion to a voting seat.
3. Voting Labor Through an Existing Appointed Seat: Under Alternative A, each appointing authority may choose to fill its existing seats with a labor representative (or other special interest stakeholder).
Staff has reviewed this question against the Committee's adopted values, the findings from Metro's countywide outreach effort, and the peer agency benchmarking analysis. Metro has a strong and productive working relationship with organized labor across multiple domains, and this relationship is reflected in concrete policy commitments that are among the most progressive in the country. Metro's agencywide Project Labor Agreement - negotiated with the Los Angeles/Orange Counties Building and Construction Trades Council and covering all construction projects valued above $2.5 million - is among the most progressive labor agreements adopted by any transit agency in the nation, and notably the first transit agency in the country to secure FTA approval for national targeted hiring goals on federally funded projects. These commitments reflect a meaningful and durable partnership between Metro and organized labor.
Metro has a strong and productive working relationship with organized labor across multiple domains,and this relationship is reflected in concrete policy commitments that are among the most progressive in the country. Metro's agencywide Project Labor Agreement - negotiated with the Los Angeles/Orange Counties Building and Construction Trades Council and covering all construction projects valued above $2.5 million - is among the most progressive labor agreements adopted by any transit agency in the nation, and notably the first transit agency in the country to secure FTA approval for national targeted hiring goals on federally funded projects. These commitments reflect a meaningful and durable partnership between Metro and organized labor.
At the June Committee meeting, County Counsel and Metro's Chief Ethics Officer advised that service by a labor representative would not constitute a categorical conflict of interest. As with any Board member, potential conflicts - including campaign contributions, sources of income, and financial interests in matters before the Board - would be evaluated on an item-by-item basis, with recusal available where required. Matters directly affecting collective bargaining or contracts impacting a member's own trades would likely require recusal, adding some administrative complexity to conflict screening. Metro’s ethics officer notes there are additional considerations that apply to a potential union or labor representative on a future Board:
• Conflicts of Interest: particularly on any collective bargaining agreement decision, labor representatives employed by a union with a source of income from the union, may be disqualified from participation or vote under state law. There may be other union related decisions not explicitly involving agreements, that could fall under the prohibitions mandated by state conflicts laws as well.
• Confidentiality: especially during sensitive labor negotiations where the Board considers status during closed sessions, there would be significant risk in exposing a labor representative to this information, potentially compromising agency positioning and its best interests.
Duty of Loyalty: although Board members representing interest groups (e.g., labor) may be a viable option for future Board composition, the more specialized the representation, particularly with private entities, the more likely that a Board Member may feel compelled to adhere to duties to those groups, rather than to Metro when those duties conflict. Further, beyond the ethics considerations, the proposal lacks alignment with community feedback, peer agency models and the Board-adopted values. Staff is further concerned that designating a formal seat for labor specifically---rather than for any of the County's other major interest groups, such as business, environmental, disability, or public health stakeholders---would raise questions of equity without a clear basis in community outreach or peer practice for treating labor differently from these other constituencies. Finally, staff notes that the labor perspective continues to be well represented on the Board, and that under the Flexible Appointment structure, Appointing Authorities would retain the flexibility to appoint individuals with labor-oriented perspectives, including the Governor’s appointee.
Incorporation of a Specified Seat for and Appointing Authority by the County's Chief Executive Officer (post 2028)
Two related questions were raised at the May Committee meeting: first, whether the elected County CEO should be statutorily appointed to the Metro Board; and second, whether the County CEO, rather than the Board of Supervisors, should hold appointing authority over the County's Metro delegation. Staff has reviewed this question against the findings from Metro's countywide outreach effort and the peer agency benchmarking analysis.
• Community Outreach: Metro's countywide outreach to the general public did not yield explicit input on the CEO seat. The summary of feedback from outreach activities notes that no organization, listening session participant, rider, or survey respondent explicitly called for including the County's future CEO in the Board's composition or granting them appointing authority. Among institutional stakeholders, three councils of governments - the South Bay Cities COG, Gateway Cities COG and the Las Virgenes-Malibu COG - took formal positions opposing any dedicated CEO seat, citing concerns about diluting city representation.
• Peer Agency Benchmarking: While the peer agency review did not identify peer agencies in which the County CEO served on the governing board, there were reference agencies in which a county executive or their designee held a seat on the governing board.
• Sound Transit's board is a three-county federated body of 17 locally elected officials (allocated to King, Pierce, and Snohomish by population) plus the WSDOT Secretary, in which each county's executive is an automatic board member who also nominates that county's other delegates, subject to confirmation by that county's council. Sound Transit's enabling statute (RCW 81.112.040) affirmatively requires each county executive to ensure that their county's board delegation includes representation from unincorporated areas of the service area, as a condition of the executive's nominating authority. At Pittsburgh Regional Transit, the Allegheny County Executive appoints a majority of the board but does not serve on it. Pittsburgh Regional Transit's enabling statute contains no comparable requirement; its criteria for the County Executive's appointees address residency and subject-matter background but not unincorporated area representation.
Measure G defines the County CEO's powers as supervising department heads, preparing the county budget, executing laws and ordinances, and emergency management, which are internal to county government operations. Measure G assigns the CEO no explicit role in intergovernmental relations, regional representation, or external governance, and is silent on the question of CEO appointment authority over external agencies. Metro is an independent regional agency, not a county department; extending the CEO's authority to Metro Board appointments would go beyond anything voters sanctioned when they passed Measure G.
The scope of the County CEO's authority over external bodies and appointments remains an open question under the ongoing Measure G implementation process. The Governance Reform Task Force is actively working through how the CEO's appointment powers apply to non-county agencies.
While the County CEO may be the only elected official to directly represent all County residents, every Metro appointee is responsible for representing the broad constituency of the jurisdiction they represent, and of Los Angeles County at large - not just their own constituents. Given that there was no community advocacy for a direct County CEO appointment or for the CEO to select the County's delegation, and that County executives do not play this role among peer agencies, staff recommends Alternative A, under which the Board of Supervisors may choose to fill one of its existing seats with the elected CEO.
Staff's most significant concern is one of timing and jurisdiction: the County's own Governance Reform Task Force, is actively defining the CEO's external-agency role, and their work is not anticipated to conclude until December 3, 2028. Measure G is also silent on any intergovernmental function for the position, in contrast to the Los Angeles City Charter, which expressly directs the Mayor to "represent the City in intergovernmental relations." Staff's recommendations do not exclude the County elected CEO from the Board: under Alternative A, the Board of Supervisors may designate the elected CEO to one of the County's five seats at any time, preserving the County's discretion on its own timeline.
Additional Concepts Discussed
Direct Appointment of Long Beach Representation
Testimony at the May 27 meeting included advocacy from nine speakers, including three elected officials representing Long Beach, one elected official from the City of Bell, the Gateway Cities COG, and three stakeholders representing Long Beach organizations, advocating for the creation of a dedicated Metro Board seat for the City of Long Beach. Proponents shared that Long Beach, as the second-largest city in Los Angeles County with a population of approximately 455,000, plays a distinct regional transportation role and that a dedicated seat would simultaneously create greater opportunity for smaller Gateway cities to secure their own representation. While this theme was not raised at any of Metro's community outreach activities, Director Hahn separately sent a letter advocating for a dedicated Long Beach seat.
A population-based equity analysis raises questions about why Long Beach (approximately 455,000 residents) would warrant a dedicated seat as the City of Los Angeles (approximately 4 million+ residents) when significantly larger population clusters in other COG areas do not have dedicated representation. Any dedicated city seat should be evaluated in the context of overall city representation on the Board, not in isolation. The existing COG ratification process provides a form of regional accountability across the 87 cities, and the historical record demonstrates that this process has produced geographic diversity in sector representation. A dedicated seat for a single city - at the expense of the broader COG-based selection process - may be difficult to explain and defend to other municipalities that have not received comparable treatment, and would disrupt the balance that the City Selection Committee structure is designed to maintain.
Opportunities for Small Cities to Participate
The role of population-weighted voting within COG subregions was also noted as making it structurally difficult for smaller cities to win a sector seat when larger cities compete. It should be noted that the City Selection committee process has yielded diverse representation from Cities across the region. Attachment E provides a summary of all of the Cities which have been represented on the Board since 1993, when the agency was established.
These governance questions may be most appropriately addressed within the City Selection Committee and League of Cities processes, where the 87 cities collectively govern how their seats are apportioned and how selection processes are structured. The Committee could encourage the City Selection Committee and the League of California Cities (Los Angeles Division) to study how the current weighted voting and sector structure affects representation equity across the 87-cities - and whether process reforms at that level, rather than a statutory dedicated seat, better address the underlying concern.
Proportional Representation for the 87 Cities
The Committee's discussion at the May meeting also raised a longstanding structural question: under Public Utilities Code §130051, the 87 cities currently hold approximately 31% of Metro's voting seats (4 of 13), while representing more than 50% of Los Angeles County's population - a gap that committee members noted has persisted since the mid-1990s without adjustment. On a population basis, the City of Los Angeles likewise holds approximately 31% of voting seats (4 of 13) while comprising approximately 39% of the County's population (2020 Census, approximately 3.9 million of 10 million); on this measure the City of Los Angeles is also under-represented relative to population. However, it should be noted that under the current structure, all constituents living in Cities are also represented by their respective County Supervisor, and the five County seats collectively represent every resident of the County, including unincorporated areas.
This population-to-seat comparison, however, does not account for the fact that many of the 87 cities operate their own municipal transit systems with their own separate governance models - including Long Beach Transit, Foothill Transit, Culver CityBus, Santa Monica's Big Blue Bus, Santa Clarita Transit, and others. Residents of these cities already have a direct local governance channel over a portion of their transit service that is not reflected in a Metro-seats-to-population ratio. As a result, while the raw percentages are accurate, the comparison may overstate the degree to which city residents lack a voice on the Metro Board, and in transit governance overall. Committee discussion noted that LADOT serves City of Los Angeles residents, so the presence of municipal operators is not a distinction unique to the 87 cities.
Public Utilities Code §130051 establishes a 35% population threshold governing the allocation of seats between the City of Los Angeles and the remaining cities. Specifically, under subdivision (e), if the population of the City of Los Angeles at any time becomes less than 35 percent of the combined population of all cities in the County, one of the two public-member positions appointed by the Mayor of Los Angeles is vacated, and the vacancy is filled by the City Selection Committee from a city not otherwise represented on the Board. At its June meeting, a committee member also proposed that “the proportional threshold should be 43.75%, not 35%; characterizing 43.75% as "exact for an 8-member board." The derivation is the standard rounding midpoint for the eight non-County seats that are divided between the City of Los Angeles (4) and the City Selection Committee (4): under proportional allocation, the City of Los Angeles is entitled to 4 of those 8 seats only while its population share equates to at least 3.5 seats, and 3.5 ÷ 8 = 43.75%. Below that share, the nearest-integer allocation is 3 seats, and the fourth seat would shift to the City Selection Committee. “
Based on the 2020 Census, there were 3,898,747 residents in LA City and 5,093,095 residents in all other Cities (8,991,842 combined). Under this alternative proposal, a shift of seat from the City of Los Angeles to the City Selection Committee would be triggered immediately given that LA City's share of the combined population of all cities in the County is approximately 43.4% (3,898,747 of 8,991,842), which falls just below the proposed 43.75% threshold.
It should be noted that LA City's share of the combined city population has remained within a band of approximately 43.2% to 44.2% at every decennial census since 1960 --- straddling the proposed 43.75% breakpoint. A threshold set at the exact proportional midpoint would create the potential for the seat to transfer and revert with successive census counts.
A population-to-seat comparison is one of several measures to determine appropriate proportional representation. The following summarizes other aspects to consider:
• Service: Metro's service is disproportionately concentrated within the City of Los Angeles: approximately 64.8% of weekly bus revenue-miles (approximately 897,000 of 1.38 million) and 66.5% of weekly bus revenue-hours operate within the City, as do approximately 49.8% of weekly rail revenue-hours and 43.4% of rail revenue-miles. Combined, approximately 62.2% of Metro's weekly bus and rail revenue-miles operate within the City.
• Ridership: Metro data for the first quarter of 2026 indicates that approximately 74% of system ridership originates within the City of Los Angeles, and Attachment D shows ridership heavily concentrated in Central, South, and East Los Angeles.
• Transit- Dependency of Population: LA City contains approximately 41% of County jobs and 42% of County households, but approximately 56% of the County's zero-vehicle households. LA City's zero-vehicle household rate (approximately 12%) is roughly double that of the balance of the County (approximately 6%).
• Agency Revenue Generation: At the June 29 meeting, a committee member argued that because two cents of sales tax is collected on every dollar of taxable sales countywide, every area of the County should be proportionally represented on the Board --- likening under-representation to "paying a tax without representation." However, sales tax follows transactions, not residents: it is levied at the point of sale, and a substantial share of countywide receipts is generated within the City of Los Angeles --- home to approximately 41% of County jobs --- by commuters, visitors, and businesses as well as residents. Moreover, geographic equity in the use of these revenues is already secured by the tax ordinances themselves rather than by board composition: Measures R and M direct local return funds to every jurisdiction on a per-capita basis, and Measure M's expenditure plan, approved by two-thirds of voters countywide, hardwires subregional equity programs and project sequencing into the ordinance. It should also be noted that sales tax is regressive, with its burden falling hardest on low-income households which disproportionately live in LA City. Finally, sales tax is only one component of Metro's budget, which also relies on fares, tolls, and state and federal funding; fare revenue is generated predominantly within the City of Los Angeles, consistent with the ridership data cited above, and discretionary state and federal grants are won in part on the strength of the ridership and service metrics produced by the dense central network.
In summary, "proportionality" varies materially depending on whether population, service supply, transit dependence, ridership, or jurisdictional balance is used as the measure, and a recommendation to the Legislature should consider multiple lenses. If a population threshold is retained in statute, the legislation should state explicitly the population base and data source against which it is measured, the timing of measurement, and the mechanism and transition provisions by which any seat transfer would occur.
Terms of Appointment
PUC §130051.6 provides that each member of the Metro Board serves a four-year term, or until a successor is appointed and qualified; may be removed at the pleasure of the appointing authority; and may be reappointed for additional terms without limitation on the number of reappointments. Consistent with the Appointment Guidelines Framework summarized in Attachment A, staff recommend retaining fixed four-year terms, including for any non-elected appointees, which would be renewable or terminable at the appointing authority's discretion, with each appointing authority retaining the ability to replace its appointee. Multi-year terms reflect the time new members need to develop familiarity with Metro's portfolio, while the renewal and replacement mechanisms preserve accountability to the appointing authority.
Reinstitution of Voting Alternates
The alternate system was discontinued largely due to the concern that alternates could hold different policy positions than the members they represented, and that accountability was diffused when it was not the appointed elected member voting on major policy and financial decisions. Reinstituting alternates would also impose a significant administrative burden on staff, who would need to manage additional briefings, noticing, and recordkeeping for a second tier of Board-eligible individuals across every appointing authority, as well as potential additional cost to the agency to support stipends and related expenses for the expanded roster. Accordingly, staff does not recommend reinstating voting alternates.
Summary of Recommendations
Based on the outreach and engagement feedback, review of peer agencies, and the objective of aligning future board composition with the adopted Governance Values, staff recommend that the Committee advance Alternative A (Flexible Appointments) as a proposed new governance structure that includes the following attributes:
• Five (5) appointees selected by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, effective January 1, [2029], who, at the discretion of the Board of Supervisors, may be members of the Board of Supervisors, the County CEO, or member(s) of the public, but each of whom shall be a resident of a different supervisorial district;
• The Mayor of Los Angeles, and three (3) designees of the Mayor, who may be members of the City Council or member(s) of the public, but each of whom shall be a resident of a different council district;
• Four (4) appointees from the City Selection Committee, who may be elected representatives or member(s) of the public.
• One (1) non-voting designee of the Governor, who may be elected representatives or member(s) of the public.
Consistent with the flexible design of Alternative A, appointing authorities are not required to select transit users or riders when filling these seats. If Alternative A is advanced by the Board, staff will transmit Appointment Guidelines to the Board following coordination with the Appointing Authorities in order to foster ongoing engagement between Board members and transit, including bus, rail, Metrolink, bike share, and municipal operator services, so that all members, regardless of prior ridership experience, build firsthand familiarity with the customer experience once appointed.
Determination_Of_Safety_Impact
DETERMINATION OF SAFETY IMPACT
This board action will not have an impact on safety standards for Metro.
Financial_Impact
FINANCIAL IMPACT
Staff's recommended option, Alternative A (Flexible Appointments), would not result in an additional number of Board Members and would therefore not have a financial impact. Options that would add a new or designated Board seat would carry additional administrative and compensation costs, as discussed above.
Equity_Platform
EQUITY PLATFORM
The evaluation of governance alternatives through a transparent, community-informed process supports Metro's equity principles by helping ensure that rider, community, stakeholder, and regional perspectives are meaningfully incorporated into discussions of potential governance changes. The outreach conducted as part of this process included engagement with riders, transit-dependent communities, local jurisdictions, advisory bodies, youth organizations, business and community stakeholders, and members of the public from across Los Angeles County.
Vehicle_Miles_Traveled_Outcome
VEHICLE MILES TRAVELED OUTCOME
VMT and VMT per capita in Los Angeles County are lower than national averages, the lowest in the SCAG region, and on the lower end of VMT per capita statewide, with these declining VMT trends due in part to Metro's significant investment in rail and bus transit.* Metro's Board-adopted VMT reduction targets align with California's statewide climate goals, including achieving carbon neutrality by 2045. To ensure continued progress, all Board items are assessed for their potential impact on VMT.
While this item does not directly encourage taking transit, sharing a ride, or using active transportation, it is a vital part of Metro operations. Because the Metro Board has adopted an agency-wide VMT Reduction Target, and this item supports the overall function of the agency, this item is consistent with the goals of reducing VMT.
*Based on population estimates from the United States Census and VMT estimates from Caltrans' Highway Performance Monitoring System (HPMS) data between 2001-2019.
Implementation_of_Strategic_Plan_Goals
IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC PLAN GOALS
The recommendations in this report advances Goal 5 - Provide responsive, accountable, and trustworthy governance within the Metro organization - by formally embedding rider representation into the Board's appointment criteria. The recommendation also supports Goal 2, Deliver outstanding trip experiences for all users of the transportation system, and Goal 3, Enhance communities and lives through mobility and access to opportunity, by ensuring that the perspectives of regular riders are present across multiple Board seats and inform decisions on service planning, fares, and capital investment. Finally, by preserving the existing intergovernmental appointment structure rather than introducing administrative disruption or additional cost, the recommendation supports Goal 4, Transform Los Angeles County through regional collaboration and national leadership, by maintaining the interagency balance that underpins Metro's regional and federal funding relationships.
Alternatives_Considered
ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED
The Board could decide to expand the Board with designated seats for the elected County CEO, special interest stakeholders, or rider representatives. This approach is not recommended for the following reasons: (1) expanding the Board would impose additional administrative and compensation costs, inconsistent with the Board-adopted governance value of fiscal stewardship and the Board's direction that any governance changes be cost neutral; (2) neither Board expansion nor designated stakeholder seats surfaced as a priority in Metro's countywide outreach, and designated seats of this kind are not a consistent practice among peer agencies; and (3) designating seats for particular offices or constituencies would narrow the representational scope applied to other Board seats and could invite competing claims from other stakeholder groups.
Alternative A (Flexible Appointments) achieves the underlying objectives - including a rider voice, potential service by the elected County CEO, and stakeholder perspectives - within the existing seat allocation among Appointing Authorities, consistent with the full set of Board-adopted Governance Values, including intergovernmental balance, fiscal stewardship, and functional effectiveness.
Based on the analysis provided above, staff does not recommend this alternative approach, and continues to recommend Alternative A.
Next_Steps
NEXT STEPS
Upon approval, staff will, pursuant to State law, submit the report to the Legislature and work to memorialize the changes to governance in the Public Utilities Code.
Attachments
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment A - Proposed Framework to Guide Appointments by Appointing Authorities
Attachment B - Motion 33.1
Attachment C - Board Adopted Governance Values
Attachment D - Ridership and Outreach Maps
Attachment E - Summary of Board Representation by City Affiliation and Size since 1993
Prepared by: Madeleine Moore, Deputy Executive Officer, Government Relations, (213) 922-4604
Marisa Perez, Deputy Chief Community Relations Officer, (213) 922-3808
Reviewed by: Nicole Englund, Chief of Staff, (213) 922-7950
